Click here for Index
                                               Email: info@searcs-web.com


                                               Searc's Web Guide to 20th Century Ireland - Frank Gallagher (1893-1962)


Frank Gallagher was born and educated in Cork. He became a journalist and short story writer, frequently writing under the pseudonyms David Hogan and Henry O'Neill. Gallagher joined Sinn Féin in 1917 and after the Sinn Féin victory in the 1918 General Election he worked with Erskine Childers on the publicity staff of the First Dáil. In 1920 Gallagher was interned in Mountjoy Gaol where he partook in a mass hunger-strike of republican prisoners in demand of political status. In the same year Gallagher published The Irish Case Stated under the pseudonym Henry O'Neill. Gallagher supported the republicans in the Civil War and was imprisoned by the Free State in 1922. During his imprisonment Gallagher published A Prisoner's Letter to His Grace the Bishop of Dublin in reply to the Bishop's pastoral letter condemning republican prisoners. Gallagher later recounted his prison experiences in Days of Fear (1929) and in Dark Mountain and Other Stories (1931).
In 1931 Gallagher became editor of The Irish Press founded by Eamon de Valera. During 'the Emergency' of World War Two Gallagher headed the Free State Government's Information Bureau and was later appointed Deputy Director of Radio Éireann. In 1954 he became a member of the Board of the National Library. Gallagher published an anti-partition thesis The Indivisible Isle (1956) and The History of Landlordism in Donegal (1962). This extract is from Gallagher's The Irish Case Stated (1920).©

The two main arguments advanced by the English Government in support of its refusal to recognise the national independence of Ireland are -
1] An independent Ireland would be a strategic danger to the British Empire, involving possible defeat to that Empire in times of war; and
2] An independent Ireland would result in the oppression of the Protestant minority, and that the English Government are pledged to prevent.
The first of these two arguments is founded on a principle which would have justified the German Empire in its attempted subjugation of the Belgian people. If strategic safety is to be the loftiest law among the nations, then the sanctity of a neighbour's rights is non-existent, for each power is naturally the ultimate judge of what is necessary to its own strategic safety.
But, as the facts stand, this question of high principle is not immediately relevant to Ireland's case. An independent Ireland could not, and would not, be a strategic danger to the British Empire. English politicians declare that the grant of full self-determination to the Irish people would inevitably lead to the establishment of an Irish Republic, and that an Irish Republic would be the sworn enemy of the British Empire and the ally of that Empire's enemies in the next war.
It is true that, if the Irish people were permitted to determine their own national existence they would reaffirm the decision they have already twice recorded to establish an independent Republic. But it is not true that the Republic would be inimical to the British Empire or the ally in war of that Empire's enemies.
Ireland is linked to England by certain economic ties of great strength. Those ties are interwoven with the very vitals of both nations, and they would remain as unbroken after the declaration of Irish independence as they are now. Two nations with an interdependent economic system cannot afford to be enemies, and the weaker nation of the two can afford enemity least. Economically it would be an act of insanity on the part of a free Irish people to remain hostile to England. As long as Ireland continues to be predominantly agricultural and England predominantly industrial the mere necessity for the exchange of products would bind the two people firmly together.
Militarily, no less than economically, it would be madness for the Irish people, once independent, to continue in unfriendly relationship with its nearest neighbour, which also happens to be one of the most powerful military states in the world.
In war-power Ireland is not now and never can be a match for England. This the Irish people understand, and they realise also that the easiest way in which they could loose their independence would be to align themselves with the enemies of England. For whatever the continental enemies of England might gain from such an alignment, Ireland would certainly pay dearly for it. Therefore, for material reasons and for the more insistent reason that England could crush Ireland within a week of a war against her by the Irish people, there can be no question of an independent Irish Republic being an enemy upon England's flank either during a period of world-peace or in the wider epoch of universal war. Peace there would be between the two nations, a peace ensured by the most binding of all international treaties, the treaty of mutual and inseparable interest, economic and strategic.
The suggestion that after the independence of Ireland has been recognised by the English there would still remain a reason for hostility between the two people's ignores the central factor of the whole question. It is not England, as such, to which the Irish people are now opposed. It is not the British Empire as such. It is solely the imposition upon the people of Ireland of a rule rejected by the people of Ireland. This is the seed of the war between the two people. As long as this imposition of a rejected rule continues - in whatever form - so long will the war continue...
English statesmen declare that North-East Ulster must not be coerced into submission to a Government chosen by all the people of Ireland. If it were not in the party interest of English politicians to refuse self-government to Ireland, English politicians would care very little for the will of the minority in Ireland - as little as they do now care for the will of the majority.
It is of much importance to understand clearly that the wishes of the Ulster Unionists are respected in England only because these wishes help England to hold Ireland. Were the Ulster Unionists to demand complete separation from the British Empire and were the Sinn Féin party to oppose separation the British Government would as readily use Sinn Féin to coerce Ulster Unionism as they are now using Ulster Unionists to help them coerce Sinn Féin.
In short, Ulster is not an Irish difficulty but an English excuse. Were there no opposition in North-East Ulster to independence England would still refuse that independence on some other plea. It is not to be forgotten that it was the Ulster Protestants who organised the national insurrection of 1798. They were crushed as ruthlessly then as Sinn Féin is being crushed now. They were crushed then because they made the same demands as Sinn Féin is making now.
© Searc's Web Guide 1997-2008
20th Century Ireland (1917-1923)    Irish History Index
Can't find what you're looking for? Check out our Research Services
© Copyright Searc.ie 1997-2008